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 Problems and Conclusions 
The US Shale Revolution and the Arab Gulf States. 
The Economic and Political Impact of Changing 
Energy Markets 
The United States will play a central role in the future 
development of the energy markets, and in interna-
tional relations in the Persian Gulf. The Gulf region 
is where the influence of the shale revolution on US 
overseas engagement acquires strategic significance. 
An American pullback could shatter the region’s secu-
rity and threaten the internal stability of the Gulf 
states. Given that these states are highly dependent on 
revenues from oil and gas exports, the question is also 
whether the shale revolution is affecting the volume 
and pricing of Arab energy exports. 
The shale revolution is, however, only one of several 
factors driving rapid change in the energy markets. 
Strong demand in Asia and within the Middle East it-
self are equally significant. The uncertainties in the 
energy markets remain large. The Russia-Ukraine cri-
sis and developments in Iran and in Iraq are known 
“wild cards”. It is hard to foresee how these trends will 
interact in the longer term. While the tight oil revolu-
tion will colour the coming decade, the Gulf region 
will remain the backbone of the global oil supply. Any 
lasting decline in oil prices would be problematic for 
the Arab Gulf states, but is not to be expected as long 
as demand in Asia remains strong. While American 
shale gas appears to be here to stay, there is no sign of 
US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports revolutionising 
the global gas trade in the medium term. Qatar is 
therefore in a good position to defend its global mar-
ket position in this sector. 
Nonetheless, the Arab Gulf states find themselves 
confronted with change in the international energy 
markets, and with the broader consequences of the 
shale boom. Moreover, their own energy demand is 
growing so strongly as to call into question their role 
as exporters. All these trends converge to create a diffi-
cult situation that is exacerbated by growing need for 
investment in infrastructure and exploration to satisfy 
rising domestic consumption. There is an urgent need 
for energy policy reform in the Gulf states, but this is 
held back by the international market situation. Socio-
politically it is too risky for the region’s rulers to raise 
domestic energy prices; economically this stance rep-
resents the main obstacle to reforms. In the longer 
term these problems will endanger the socio-economic 
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5 
Problems and Conclusions 
development of the Gulf states. Their state budgets are 
coming under growing pressure as the need for major 
investments in the energy sector intersects with pres-
sure to keep domestic energy prices low. Well-stocked 
reserve funds would cover this strategy for some years 
to come, but at the price of squandering the resources 
required for structural reforms. 
The foreign policy and security consequences of 
the shale revolution are also hard to assess. While Gulf 
politicians play down the issue, they are in fact very 
unsettled by fears of an American withdrawal. The 
shale revolution could further heighten their already 
existing doubts about Washington’s reliability. Espe-
cially in the case of Saudi Arabia, such fears have for 
some years already fostered a more independent – 
some observers would say “offensive” or “aggressive” – 
foreign policy that exacerbates regional conflicts. 
The shale revolution will make North America self-
sufficient in energy for quite some time, and expand 
Washington’s policy options in the Gulf. But it is not 
yet clear whether and how it will exploit these new 
possibilities. There is certainly no indication of the 
United States scaling down its diplomatic and military 
engagement in the Gulf. Ultimately, the region’s ener-
gy wealth is but one reason for the US presence, and 
the Gulf states remain crucial as the backbone of the 
global oil supply. Washington can be expected to push 
for international burden-sharing, given that its Euro-
pean partners profit from its protection of Middle East 
oil and gas supplies (as do China and India in particu-
lar). The prospect of self-sufficiency allows the Ameri-
cans to demand – principally from Germany and Eu-
rope – either a military contribution or a share of the 
cost of maintaining a presence in the Gulf. On the 
other hand, Washington would be wary of any step-
ping up of Beijing’s political or security engagement. 
Although Europe’s wider neighbourhood will re-
main decisive for its own direct energy supply in the 
medium term, the Persian Gulf retains long-term stra-
tegic importance. In view of the region’s geopolitical 
imponderables and the associated supply risks there 
are good reasons for Germany and Europe to push 
ahead with the shift to renewables, especially in the 
transport and mobility sectors. Qatari natural gas 
could contribute to diversification of European gas 
supplies. At the same time the new energy map de-
mands greater dialogue and cooperation above all 
within the OECD – in cooperation with the emerging 
economies, but also in energy partnerships with the 
Gulf states. 
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The US Shale Revolution and Its Geo-economic Consequences 
The US Shale Revolution and the Dynamics of the 
Global Energy Markets 
 
In order to clarify how the shale revolution affects 
stability in the Gulf, we must first examine its conse-
quences more broadly. This means firstly the supply 
situation in the United States, secondly the interna-
tional energy markets and the Gulf states’ bilateral 
energy trade. The further we look into the future, the 
more uncertain the forecasts.1 The uppermost ques-
tion for the Gulf states is whether the shale revolution 
will lead to loss of market share and shrinking reve-
nues. As we will see, this will depend not only on fick-
le price trends, but equally on future demand in Asia, 
in Europe, and within the Gulf itself. 
Not without reason has the International Energy 
Agency underlined the “unprecedented uncertainty” 
facing the energy markets since 2010.2 The “known 
unknowns” that could refashion energy market trends 
currently include the Russia-Ukraine crisis and geo-
political developments in Iran and in Iraq. 
The US Shale Revolution and Its Geo-
economic Consequences 
The US shale revolution was made possible by the 
fracking process, which uses liquids and chemicals to 
release unconventional gas and oil deposits that are 
otherwise unexploitable. The breakthrough was 
achieved by the combination of hydraulic fracturing 
(fracking) with horizontal drilling. This development 
began less than ten years ago, driven by the high level 
of gas and oil prices. 
The boom in unconventional oil and gas – above all 
tight oil and shale gas in the United States, oil sands 
in Canada – is making North America self-sufficient in 
energy.3 By mid-2013 the United States had become 
1  Developments concerning the next three years are charac-
terised in this study as “short-term”; “medium-term” relates 
to the three- to five-year timeframe, “long-term” to the ten- 
to fifteen-year. 
2  International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook 2010 
(Paris: OECD and IEA, 2010). 
3  The spectrum of formations that can be designated “uncon-
ventional” in this context is very broad and poorly defined. 
The term encompasses geographical, geological, technologi-
cal, and chemical differences vis-à-vis conventional reserves 
the world’s largest energy producer. Fracking is now 
an established technology, with continuous improve-
ments leading to falling costs, efficiency gains and 
rising recovery rates. While it is hard to predict future 
technological developments, today’s figures are already 
impressive. 
Shale gas: Between 2005 and 2012 US natural gas 
production increased by one quarter.4 The United 
States extracted 687 billion cubic metres of natural 
gas in 2013,5 overtaking Russia as the largest produc-
er. In its World Energy Outlook 2013, the IEA assumes 
that production of natural gas in the United States 
and the NAFTA region as a whole (United States, Cana-
da and Mexico) will increase continuously until 2035, 
at an annual rate of 1.1 percent.6 
But for about the past three years the American 
shale gas industry has been experiencing a market 
adjustment process, because extraction costs (not to 
speak of investment costs) were generally higher than 
realised prices. The rapid growth rates have therefore 
slowed. The price achieved at the main American dis-
tribution hub, Henry Hub in Louisiana, in 2012 was 
about $2 per million British thermal units (MBtu).7 But 
shale gas is only regarded as economic at a price level 
between $3 and $8 depending on the specific play,8 
although the break-even price falls significantly (to 
$0.55 per MBtu) where both dry gas and lucrative con-
densate or crude are extracted from the same well.9 
and production methods. In the United States the new frack-
ing technologies behind the production boom are employed 
principally to extract shale gas (from sandstone, mudstone 
and carbonate reservoirs), tight gas and tight oil (from dense 
strata), and shale oil. 
4  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (London: BP, 2014), 22. 
5  Ibid. 
6  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2013), 108. 
7  U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Henry Hub 
Natural Gas Spot Price”, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/ 
rngwhhdd.htm (accessed 1 September 2014). 
8  Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), The Future of 
Natural Gas: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study (Boston, 2011). 
9  Gürcan Gülen, John Browning, Svetlana Ikonnikova and 
Scott W. Tinker, “Well Economics across Ten Tiers in Low and 
High Btu (British thermal unit) Areas, Barnett Shale, Texas”, 
Energy 60 (2013): 302–15. The “break-even price” is the thresh-
old at which production becomes profitable. Theoretically, 
variable and fixed costs are then covered. 
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The US Shale Revolution and the Dynamics of the Global Energy Markets 
Figure 1 
US gas production, consumption and net imports/ 
exports (trillion cubic feet) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
http://www.eia.gov (accessed 22 August 2014). 
In 2013 the average gas price was $3.73, in the first 
half of 2014 $4.90.10 These figures are, however, ap-
proximations that will vary considerably depending 
on formation, type of extracted hydrocarbons, age of 
well, technology used and regulatory requirements. 
One decisive development in recent years is that 
US gas production has increased considerably faster 
than domestic consumption. The pipeline-connected 
NAFTA gas market now increasingly satisfies domestic 
needs. Consequently, total natural gas imports to the 
United States fell by more than 30 percent between 
2008 and 2013, LNG imports to one tenth.11 Because 
the United States has practically ceased importing 
LNG from overseas, the North American gas market 
has become largely detached from the international 
markets. Interestingly, there have been extreme fluc-
tuations in gas imports from Qatar during the past ten 
years. The United States purchased most gas there in 
2011 (3 percent of total imports), at a point where the 
shale gas boom was already in full swing.12 
 
10  Calculations based on data from EIA, “Henry Hub Natural 
Gas Spot Price” (see note 7). 
11  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (see note 4), 30. 
12  EIA, “U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Imports from Qatar”, 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9103qr2A.htm (accessed 
7 April 2014). 
Figure 2 
Gulf states’ shares of US gas  
imports (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD, UNCTADstat, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN 
(accessed 22 August 2014). 
In terms of repercussions on the international gas 
markets, the shale revolution has further reinforced 
the existing division into three major regional mar-
kets (North America, Europe, Asia/Pacific). The United 
States has largely detached itself not only from LNG 
imports, but also from the international pricing mech-
anisms. Given the existing infrastructure in the North 
American and European markets, pipeline gas domi-
nates in both, whereas LNG accounts for more than 
80 percent in the Asia-Pacific region. LNG is also cen-
tral to an increasingly global and flexible gas trade. 
Alongside the shale gas boom, rising demand for gas 
in Japan (and South Korea) after the reactor meltdown 
in Fukushima in 2011 has reinforced the segmentation 
between gas markets. This demand boost increased 
the Pacific market’s share to almost 75 percent of the 
global LNG trade. North America’s share in 2013 was 
something over 1 percent, Europe’s about 15 percent.13 
One effect of the shale gas boom is that the United 
States profits from very low gas prices in OECD com-
parison. In 2013 the average price in the United States 
was about $4.8 per MBtu; the comparable figure for 
Europe was $8.7 and the Far East $16.3.14 The shale gas
13  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (see note 4), 38. 
14  Energy Comment, Global Energy Briefing 6, no. 101, August 
2014, 3. 
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The US Shale Revolution and Its Geo-economic Consequences 
Figure 3 
US crude production, consumption and net 
imports/exports (million barrels/day) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
http://www.eia.gov (accessed 22 August 2014). 
boom has generated considerable differences between 
the pricing mechanisms in the three main markets. 
Whereas gas-to-gas competition rules in the United 
States and about half the European gas trade is today 
based on spot market prices (tendency rising), the Asia-
Pacific region is still long-term and oil-indexed.15 That 
creates considerable price differences, because oil 
price indexing in particular keeps the gas price high. 
One of the open questions for the future is to what ex-
tent prices in the different gas markets will converge. 
This will depend on the extent of US gas exports, 
new LNG projects and demand trends. In mid-2014 
it would appear that the differences are set to lessen, 
but that the United States will retain relative price 
advantages in gas and electricity.16 
Tight oil: Overall, US oil production increased by 
50 percent during the past three years; at the begin-
ning of 2014 production amounted to 8.1 million 
barrels/day.17 In 2013 tight oil contributed about 
15  Gas-to-gas competition is increasing as oil price indexing 
for natural gas declines in Europe. DG Energy, Quarterly Report 
on European Gas Markets 1/2013, Market Observatory for Energy 
(Brussels, 2013), 14f. 
16  The IEA also shares this expectation, see IEA, World Energy 
Outlook 2013 (see note 6), 24, 261–300. 
17  EIA, “Crude Oil Production”, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/ 
pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm (accessed 5 November 
Figure 4 
Gulf states’ shares of US imports of crude oil and 
petroleum products (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (see Fig. 2, p. 8). 
2.3 million barrels/day to that figure.18 Total US 
production is projected to increase to 11.8 million 
barrels/day by 2025.19 But after that the IEA and the US 
Energy Information Administration both expect the 
production curve to flatten off.20 So on the basis of 
current data, the role of OPEC oil would have to ex-
pand again from the mid-2020s, if global demand is 
to be satisfied.21 But future North American oil pro-
duction will depend on technological progress, on 
cost, and on international prices; longer-term trends 
are therefore almost impossible to predict. 
The impact of the tight oil boom on bilateral trade 
between the United States and the Arab Gulf states is 
limited, because Washington has been working since 
the oil crises of the 1970s to reduce its dependency on 
imports from the Middle East. Thus even before the 
2013); Commerzbank, Commodity Research, 17 January 2014, 4. 
18  EIA, “Annual Energy Outlook 2014: Market Trends: Liquid 
Fuels”, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/MT_liquidfuels.cfm# 
tight_oil (accessed 7 April 2014). 
19  Commerzbank, Commodity Research 6, no. 101, 17 January 
2014, 4. 
20  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (see note 6), 481; Adam 
Sieminski, “Outlook for U.S. Shale Oil and Gas”, presentation 
at the IAEE/AEA meeting, 4 January 2014, Philadelphia, http:// 
www.eia.gov/pressroom/presentations/sieminski_ 01042014. 
pdf (accessed 10 July 2014). 
21  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (see note 6), 457. 
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The US Shale Revolution and the Dynamics of the Global Energy Markets 
Map 1 
Global gas trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources Map 1 and 2: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (London, 2014), 29 (gas trade), 19 (oil trade). 
 
shale revolution began, the United States was no lon-
ger importing strategically relevant amounts from the 
Gulf.22 The direct impact of the shale revolution on Gulf 
exporters has therefore been small to date. Between 
2006 and 2013 average US imports fell slightly, from 
2.2 million to 2.0 million barrels/day. Imports from 
Saudi Arabia, which supplies 13 percent of total US oil 
imports, also fell only slightly.23 This is partly because 
refineries configure their processes for specific grades 
of crude. American tight oil is high quality with a low 
sulphur content, and has principally substituted West 
22  Daniel Yergin, The Global Impact of US Shale (Project Syndi-
cate, 8 January 2014), http://www.project-syndicate.org/ 
commentary/daniel-yergin-traces-the-effects-of-america-s-
shale-energy-revolution-on-the-balance-of-global-economic-
and-political-power (accessed 7 April 2014). 
23  From 1.5 million barrels/day to 1.3 million. EIA, “U.S. Im-
ports by Country of Origin”, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_ 
move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm (accessed 
7 April 2014). 
African crude of similar quality. Saudi Arabia, on the 
other hand, supplies heavy oil with a high sulphur 
content, which is more susceptible to displacement by 
Canadian tar sands. But the state-owned Saudi Aramco 
is also active in the US refining sector, where it can to 
some extent secure the market for its own crude.24 
With respect to the international oil markets, the 
shale boom leaves the United States importing less 
crude and exporting (net) more oil products.25 This 
24  Clifford Krauss, “Texas Refinery Is Saudi Foothold in US 
Market”, New York Times, 4 April 2013, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/04/05/business/texas-refinery-is-saudi-foothold-in-us-
market.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (accessed 10 July 2014). 
25  The United States possesses the world’s largest installed 
refining capacity, with 18.2 percent of global volume in 2012. 
IEA, Key World Energy Statistics 2013 (Paris, 2013), http://www. 
iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld 
2013_FINAL_WEB.pdf (accessed 5 November 2013), 11, 21, 23. 
Exports of petrol and diesel are at historic records: 310,000 
barrels/day and 480,000 barrels/day. 
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The US Shale Revolution and Its Geo-economic Consequences 
Map 2 
Global oil trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
has repercussions above all on other producers of light 
oil, and places increasing pressure on European refin-
eries. The Gulf region, on the other hand, remains ab-
solutely crucial to the international oil markets. Even 
after the shale revolution, a loss of production there 
would be almost impossible to compensate. Almost 24 
percent of global oil production is in the Gulf, and one 
third of the entire international oil trade originates 
there, destined principally for Asia.26 The Gulf pos-
sesses the largest spare production capacity and as 
such plays a decisive role in setting the global oil 
price. 
As far as price trends are concerned, the decisive 
observation is that despite the US tight oil boom the 
international price has remained stable and high 
since 2010/2011. The reason for this is steadily rising 
demand in Asia coupled with supply disruption in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Libya, Syria, Iran). Addi-
26  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (see note 4), 6, 8, 18. 
tionally, large, older conventional fields across the 
world are gradually passing plateau production, with 
reservoir pressure dropping and/or equipment and 
infrastructure requiring renewal.27 This trend will 
accelerate. It is also clear that demand is the central 
determinant of developments in the energy markets. 
The extent to which the United States again becomes 
more dependent on oil imports from the Middle East 
after its oil boom tails off (as expected for the mid-
2020s) will depend above all on whether it succeeds 
in switching from oil to cleaner natural gas and 
boosting energy efficiency. Both are declared goals 
of the Obama Administration. 
27  IEA, Mid-Term Oil Market Report 2014 (Paris: IEA and OECD, 
June 2014), 18f. 
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The US Shale Revolution and the Dynamics of the Global Energy Markets 
The New Energy Map 
The energy map is changing rapidly.28 The US shale 
revolution is a central accelerating factor, but not 
solely decisive. Another equally important aspect is 
that future demand increases will be located almost 
exclusively in East Asia and the Middle East. The 
United States is not only still the biggest energy con-
sumer (alongside China), but now a leading oil and 
gas producer. The Arab Gulf states are witnessing a 
countervailing trend, as they shift from being major 
producers to significant consumers. 
The shale revolution provides the United States 
with access to an energy supply that is stable, reliable, 
affordable, and in the case of natural gas also relative-
ly clean. This significantly enhances its energy securi-
ty. And reduced vulnerability to energy crises also 
expands Washington’s strategic options, for example 
to impose embargoes on energy-rich states. Other 
major energy consumers, like Europe, China, India, 
Japan and South Korea, on the other hand, find them-
selves confronted with growing import dependency. 
And the more oil and gas they have to import from 
abroad, the stronger their dependency on secure trade 
routes and shipping. Global supply and demand pat-
terns are shifting; as Europe’s demand stagnates, trade 
flows migrate to the Pacific. This changes states’ geo-
political interests and mind maps, even if non-energy 
interests relating to security and order – such as the 
fight against terrorism – remain extant. 
It is, however, not only the rapidity of change that 
characterises the energy markets, but also the histori-
cally unprecedented uncertainty about future develop-
ments.29 On the supply side it is hard to assess where 
and when fracking will be adopted in other coun-
tries,30 whether and how the cost factor for the new 
technologies will change, and how and where envi-
ronmental regulations may restrict production or 
increase costs. On top of that come geopolitical risks 
in the so-called strategic ellipse (Russia, Caspian, Mid-
28  As also argued by the IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (see 
note 6). 
29  Ibid. 
30  Geological and market circumstances and political frame-
works vary globally between regions and countries and are 
not necessarily comparable with the favourable conditions in 
the United States. Nonetheless, China, Australia, Argentina 
and Russia can be expected to follow in introducing fracking. 
IEA, Medium-Term Oil Market Report 2014 (Paris: OECD and IEA, 
2014); IEA, Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2014 (Paris: OECD 
and IEA, 2014). 
dle East), which houses over 70 percent of the world’s 
conventional oil and gas reserves. Event-related risks 
also play a role; for example, accidents can quickly 
disrupt supplies. 
How demand for the various energy sources will 
develop is also uncertain. Future energy demand will 
depend strongly on economic growth in China, India 
and East Asia, as well as on the as yet unclarified fate 
of nuclear power in Japan and South Korea. The future 
energy mix is also hard to foresee. At the global level 
it is predicted that oil, gas and coal will continue to 
dominate with roughly equal shares of about 27 per-
cent.31 But regionally the ratio could differ considera-
bly. Fuel switch effects, for example where gas and/or 
renewables replace coal for electricity generation, 
are absolutely decisive. In the mobility and transport 
sector oil could lose ground to gas and/or electromo-
bility. In industry, not least petrochemicals, natural 
gas is increasingly favoured for process heat and feed-
stock. These substitution effects also have effects on 
price trends, but these are hard to predict. Additional-
ly, there is unclarity about national and international 
environmental regulation and climate protection. 
Such moves would promote a shift from “dirty” coal 
to “clean” natural gas, but could also place limits on 
fracking. 
In view of such imponderables, a wait-and-see atti-
tude can be observed, especially in the traditional pro-
ducing countries. But risk aversion is also noticeable 
among the big multinational oil corporations, which 
have for some years shied away from major invest-
ments in big new fields. Here the investment cycles 
are long and significant capital is required. Such equi-
vocation also favours the “smaller” shale gas and tight 
oil projects (close to existing markets and infrastruc-
ture), which have shorter investment cycles and are 
often more quickly realised, cheaper and less complex. 
Another unanswered question is how much domestic 
natural gas the United States will export, and whether 
export restrictions on crude oil will be eased. 
31  BP, Energy Outlook 2030 (January 2013), http://www.bp.com/ 
content/dam/bp/pdf/statistical-review/EnergyOutlook2030/ 
BP_Energy_Outlook_2030_Booklet_2013.pdf (accessed 31 July 
2014). 
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US-Exports: Strategic Considerations and Commercial Rationale 
US-Exports: Strategic Considerations 
and Commercial Rationale 
While the shale gas boom was discussed in the United 
States – at least until Russia’s annexation of Crimea – 
as a matter of economic benefit, the debate on crude 
oil has traditionally been more strategically coloured. 
This also influences US export policy. Since spring 
2014, responding to the Ukraine crisis, Washington 
has been seriously discussing selectively relaxing re-
strictions on crude oil and natural gas exports.32 But 
to date this has involved only isolated proposals affect-
ing particular deposits or oil grades. The ban on ex-
porting crude remains in place.33 
Gas exports also remain restricted,34 even though 
studies commissioned by the US Department of Ener-
32  American oil producers lobby to that end, because while 
US refineries profit from the local “oil glut”, producers lose 
their “rents”. 
33  Despite the ban, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), 
an agency of the US Department of Trade, may issue export 
licences, but only on condition that an equivalent amount of 
oil is also imported. It must also be possible to terminate the 
contract immediately if the US oil supply is interrupted or 
seriously threatened. See BIS, Short Supply Controls, 2f., http:// 
www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/425-
part-754-short-supply-controls (accessed 22 October 2013). For 
detail see Julia Howald, Stormy-Annika Mildner and Kirsten 
Westphal, Tipping the Power Balance? The Shale Revolution and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Transatlantic Academy Publications, 7 March 
2014), http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/ 
tipping-power-balance-shale-revolution-and-us-foreign-policy 
(accessed 31 July 2014). 
34  Under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, anyone wishing to 
export natural gas must first apply for a licence from the US 
Department of Energy. If the recipient is a country with a free 
trade agreement with the United States, the licence will be 
“granted without modification or delay”. In this case LNG ex-
ports are automatically regarded as concordant with the na-
tional interest. But if the exports are destined for a country 
without a FTA, the Department must decide whether they 
are in the national interest, taking into consideration factors 
including domestic demand, supply situation, environmental 
aspects and geopolitical questions. On 15 August 2014 the 
Department changed the procedures. First, applications to 
export liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the lower-48 states to 
non-FTA countries have to be reviewed by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) as required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). FERC is responsible for ap-
proving the construction and expansion of import and export 
facilities, where it also considers aspects of environmental 
protection and safety. For detail see Michael Ratner, Paul W. 
Parfomak, Ian F. Fergusson and Linda Luther, U.S. Natural Gas 
Exports: New Opportunities, Uncertain Outcomes (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, 17 September 2013), http:// 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42074.pdf (accessed 21 October 2013); 
gy demonstrate that LNG exports would benefit the US 
economy as a whole.35 
The question of how much domestically produced 
gas the United States will export as LNG from 2015/ 
2016 is of strategic importance for the international 
gas markets. Export contracts are appearing with 
Henry-Hub indexed price formulas but without specif-
ic destination clauses. It is clear that US LNG projects 
require long-term contracts as the basis for final in-
vestment decisions and commercial realisation.36 
Given the present situation in the energy markets, 
this appears to be a larger obstacle than the formal 
approval process. In other words, profit expectations 
and business models will decide whether the United 
States becomes a net gas exporter in the coming 
years.37 In 2013 the United States already exported 
330,000 barrels/day of gas condensates (propane, bu-
tane, etc.), making it one of the biggest exporters in 
that category.38 
 
BIS, Short Supply Controls (see note 33), 2f.; Blake Clayton, The 
Case for Allowing U.S. Crude Oil Exports, Policy Innovation Memo-
randum 34 (July 2013), http://www.cfr.org/oil/case-allowing-
us-crude-oil-exports/p31005 (accessed 21 October 2013); 
http://energy.gov/fe/downloads/order-precedence-non-fta-lng-
export-applications (accessed 28 October 2014). 
35  NERA Economic Consulting, Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG 
Exports from the United States (Washington, D.C., 2012), http:// 
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/nera_lng_report.pdf 
(accessed 7 April 2014); ICF International, U.S. LNG Exports: 
Impacts on Energy Markets and the Economy (Fairfax, 2013). 
36  IEA, Medium-Term Gas Market Report (Paris, 2014), 15. 
37  As of September 2014, 35 applications have been submit-
ted to the Department of Energy for LNG export terminals 
with an overall capacity of 1,053 million cubic metres/day for 
non-FTA countries. As of 14 October 2014 the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission had approved four terminals, but 
only one, Sabine Pass in Louisiana, is actually in possession 
of all necessary permits and under construction (see note 34). 
The first US exports from Sabine Pass are expected in late 
2015/early 2016, with a volume of 61 million cubic metres/ 
day. U.S. Department of Energy, Summary of LNG Export Applica-
tions (2014), http://energy.gov/fe/downloads/summary-lng-
export-applications-lower-48-states (accessed 20 October 
2014); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, North American 
Import/Export LNG Terminals, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/ 
gas/indus-act/lng/lng-approved.pdf (accessed 20 October 2014). 
38  Bassam Fattouh, The US Shale Revolution and the Changes in 
LPG Trade Dynamics: A Threat to the GCC? Oxford Energy Com-
ment (Oxford, July 2014), 2. 
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US Strategic Interests 
US Strategic Interests 
 
The United States has been the dominant political and 
military power in the Persian Gulf since the Iran-Iraq 
War of 1980–1988. And securing access to the region’s 
oil reserves has been a central priority since the end 
of the 1970s.39 In that context, the question arises 
whether Washington’s policy in the Gulf would alter 
if the shale revolution reduced its oil and gas imports 
from this region while at the same time energy depen-
dencies in Europe and Asia increased. US retrench-
ment could have far-reaching consequences for the 
states in the Persian Gulf. 
Changes in the energy markets are only one of  
several relevant factors in this regard. More recently, 
Washington’s military security and options have been 
noticeably restricted by budget constraints, political 
polarisation in Washington and the intervention-
weariness of the American public. The coincidence of 
more restrictive domestic circumstances with the 
shale revolution is a major contributing factor to the 
assumption (or fear) within and outside the country 
that the United States could withdraw from the Gulf 
region.40 
However there is to date no objective evidence 
for such plans, and it is significant that non-energy-
related interests continue to dominate US policy to-
wards the Gulf. This applies above all to non-prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction, not least with 
respect to the Iranian nuclear programme, and to the 
fight against terrorism.41 The latter point has become 
yet more important after the Islamic State in Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) captured major Iraqi cities in summer 
2014. American politicians also cite protecting Israel 
as a relevant reason for the continuing US presence in 
the Persian Gulf. 
39  Sarah E. Emerson and Andrew C. Winner, “The Myth 
of Petroleum Independence and Foreign Policy Isolation”, 
Washington Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2014): 21–34 (22). 
40  Ibid., 21. 
41  The White House, “Remarks by Tom Donilon, National 
Security Advisor to the President, at the Launch of Columbia 
University’s Center on Global Energy Policy”, 24 April 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/04/24/ 
remarks-tom-donilon-national-security-advisor-president-
launch-columbia- (accessed 7 April 2014). 
Nonetheless, it is widely assumed in Washington 
that the shale revolution will reduce US energy im-
port dependency and thus open up new policy op-
tions. This perception could in the medium to long 
term bring about changes in the mix of instruments 
deployed by the United States, for example in terms 
of a less direct military engagement that prioritises 
helping the Gulf states to build their own capabilities. 
Economic sanctions could also become more impor-
tant relative to military options. 
US Engagement in the Persian Gulf 
In his second term President Obama has invested in-
creasing diplomatic capital in the Gulf and the Middle 
East, both in talks over the Iranian nuclear programme 
and in efforts to restart the Middle East peace process. 
Since 2013 Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary 
of Defence Chuck Hagel have signalled Washington’s 
intention to strengthen engagement in the region in 
order to counteract insecurity among the Gulf states, 
not least Saudi Arabia, caused by US diplomatic over-
tures to Iran. 
The military presence is a good indicator of Wash-
ington’s engagement in the Gulf. After the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 there were more than 120,000 US troops 
there and another 25,000 in Kuwait.42 Most US forces 
had been withdrawn from Saudi Arabia by 2003. At 
the end of 2011 the American armed forces also left 
Iraq. But the withdrawals from Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
were accompanied by expansion or consolidation of 
the US military presence in Qatar, Kuwait and Bah-
rain. 
Despite these major fluctuations, the overall 
“American footprint” in the six member-states of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council was significantly larger in 
2013 than before the Iraq War. Whereas the United 
States had about 14,000 troops stationed in the GCC 
states in 2002, by 2013 the figure had risen to more 
 
 
42  International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),  
The Military Balance 2004 (London, 2004), 126, 129. 
SWP Berlin 
The US Shale Revolution and the Arab Gulf States 
November 2014 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
US Engagement in the Persian Gulf 
Map 3 
US military presence in the Persian Gulf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 2014 (London, 2014). 
 
than 26,000.43 Altogether in 2013 there were approxi-
mately 35,000 US troops in the Persian Gulf or its im-
mediate vicinity.44 The American presence includes 
modern air, sea and land forces, as well as missile de-
fence components (ship-based interceptor systems, 
radar installations and Patriot SAM batteries).45 US 
naval forces in the Gulf region, which normally com-
prise forty vessels and at least one carrier battle group, 
are of particular strategic significance.46 The US Fifth 
Fleet is based in Bahrain. 
43  The six members of the GCC are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Figures 
based on IISS, The Military Balance 2002 (London, 2002); IISS, 
The Military Balance 2014 (London, 2014). 
44  U.S. Department of Defense, IISS Manama Dialogue: Speech 
Delivered by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel (Manama, Bahrain, 
7 December 2013), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ 
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5336 (accessed 7 April 2014). 
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid. 
Secretary of Defence Hagel recently reiterated that 
Washington has no plans to alter its military presence 
in the Gulf region.47 The Arab Gulf states in particular 
are anxious that a relaxation of US-Iranian relations – 
as appeared to be on the cards after the November 
2013 interim agreement between Tehran and the E3+3 
– could open the door to a US military withdrawal.48 
In fact, the United States expanded its Gulf mine-
sweeping capacity after Tehran threatened in early 
2012 to blockade the Strait of Hormuz.49 It also ex-
47  Ernesto Londoño, “Hagel, in Saudi Arabia, Tells Arab 
States Not to Fear Nuclear Talks with Iran”, Washington Post, 
14 May 2014. 
48  The E3+3 comprises three EU members (France, United 
Kingdom, Germany) plus the United States, Russia and China. 
49  Jean-Loup Samaan, The Strategic Dimensions of the Shale Gas 
Revolution: Shared Views from NATO and Gulf Countries, Confer-
ence Report (Rome: NATO Defense College, October 2013), 2; 
Eric Schmitt, “Eyes on Iran: Navy in Gulf Stays Ready”, 
New York Times, 9 December 2013. 
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panded the Fifth Fleet’s headquarters in Bahrain, 
reportedly investing $580 million. Since 2008 the 
base’s contingent has more than doubled from 3,000 
to 7,000.50 
The Debate in the United States 
There is thus as yet little to suggest that the shale 
revolution is encouraging a US political and/or mili-
tary withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. In fact, in 
September 2013 President Barack Obama promised 
the United Nations General Assembly that the United 
States would continue to guarantee the security of 
global trade routes despite its own declining depend-
ency on foreign oil.51 
“Energy independence” is very positively conno-
tated in the United States and remains a declared goal 
of the Administration.52 Nonetheless, experts prefer 
to speak of “energy security” or “energy self-sufficien-
cy”,53 because the United States and its closest allies 
will continue to be affected by developments in the 
international energy markets. In the American media 
and think-tanks there are growing calls for the trans-
formation of the energy markets to be reflected in a 
broader distribution of the costs and risks associated 
with securing the trade routes in the Persian Gulf 
and in Asia.54 As well as its European allies, China and 
India in particular profit from Washington’s security 
presence in the region. Thus far Washington has 
50  Hendrick Simoes, “Bahrain Expansion Latest Signal of 
Continued US Presence”, Stars and Stripes, 13 December 2013, 
http://www.stripes.com/news/bahrain-expansion-latest-signal-
of-continued-us-presence-1.257371 (accessed 7 April 2014). 
51  The White House, “Remarks by the President Obama in 
Address to the United Nations General Assembly”, 24 Septem-
ber 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/ 
09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-
general-assembly (accessed 1.8.2014). 
52  The White House, “President Barack Obama’s State of the 
Union Address”, 28 January 2014, http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-
union-address (accessed 7 April 2014). 
53  On the basis of interviews in the US Departments of 
State, Energy and Defence and in the US Senate, conducted 
in March 2014 in Washington, D.C. 
54  Ian Bremmer and Kenneth A. Hersh, “When America 
Stops Importing Energy”, New York Times, 22 May 2013; 
Tim Johnson, “Impact of US Oil Boom: Global Reordering”, 
McClatchy-Tribune/MSN News, 28 November 2013; Elizabeth Ros-
enberg, Energy Rush: Shale Production and U.S. National Security 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, Febru-
ary 2014). 
downplayed the burden-sharing debate, but this could 
change in the medium term. Concrete security de-
mands would be addressed in the first place to Europe. 
Greater Indian (or still less Chinese) engagement in 
the Persian Gulf would appear less geopolitically desir-
able from the US standpoint. 
There is a widely shared expectation in Administra-
tion and Congress that the shale revolution will create 
new leeway and new foreign policy options. Funda-
mentally, the thinking runs, domestic oil and gas pro-
duction strengthen the US economy and thus the ma-
terial basis of American foreign and security policy.55 
It is also suggested that the energy boom will make 
security objectives easier to achieve.56 As an example 
of new possibilities opened up by the shale revolution, 
commentators and government officials frequently 
cite the implementation of international sanctions 
against Iran, arguing that growing oil production 
in the United States neutralises worries about rising 
world market prices and thus enables action to be 
taken against Iranian oil exports.57 Members of Con-
gress argue that increasing energy self-sufficiency in 
North America serves US national security by reducing 
the danger of price shocks caused by conflicts in the 
Middle East. Thus, they say, the United States also be-
comes more independent of “unstable dictators like 
Bashar al-Assad”.58 President Obama has also used this 
argument himself.59 
55  David Hastings Dunn and Mark J. L. McClelland, “Shale 
Gas and the Revival of American Power: Debunking Decline?” 
International Affairs 89, no. 6 (2013): 1411–28 (1412); Bill Flores 
and Henry Cuellar, “America Needs Its Shale Energy and Hy-
draulic Fracturing Provides It”, The Hill, 19 November 2013. 
56  Tom Donilon, “Energy and American Power: Farewell to 
Declinism”, Foreign Affairs, 15 June 2013. 
57  Roger Howard, “How Shale Energy Reshapes American 
Security”, National Interest, 3 May 2013; Information Handling 
Services, Daniel Yergin: Unconventional Oil and Gas Revolution in 
US “Goes beyond Energy Itself”, 5 February 2013, http://press.ihs. 
com/press-release/energy-power/daniel-yergin-unconvention 
al-oil-and-gas-revolution-us-goes-beyond-energy (accessed 
16 April 2014). 
58  Republican Representatives Lee Terry, member of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee. Lee Terry, “Mideast 
Instability Necessitates Keystone Pipeline”, The Hill, 3 Septem-
ber 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-en 
vironment/319995-mideast-instability-necessitates-keystone-
pipeline- (accessed 4 August 2014). 
59  For example: The White House, “Remarks by the President 
on American Energy”, Argonne National Laboratory, Lemont, 
Illinois, 15 March 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/03/15/remarks-president-american-energy-lemont-
illinois (accessed 4 August 2014). 
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The Debate in the United States 
Other geopolitical effects of the shale revolution 
are also discussed in the United States. Whereas 
American leaders see opportunities for US power and 
action, they regard the main producers of conven-
tional oil and gas – the OPEC states, Russia and Iran – 
as losers of the shale revolution and expected their 
shrinking market shares to hamper their ability to 
exploit their energy resources for foreign policy pur-
poses.60 Ultimately, at least in the longer term, Wash-
ington also believes it will be able to make its Europe-
an partners more independent of Russia by supplying 
LNG, which is especially significant in the context of 
the Ukraine crisis.61 
Not all of these arguments are shared in expert cir-
cles. For example American energy experts doubt that 
the shale revolution actually facilitates the implemen-
tation of international energy sanctions,62 especially 
where the United States is not yet exporting oil and 
gas on any large scale. They also point out that the 
American gas sector functions overwhelmingly as a 
free market, where Washington cannot simply “de-
cree” exports, for example to Europe. But regardless 
of such objective scepticism, “economic statecraft” is 
gaining ground in the United States as enthusiasm 
for military operations wanes.63 
Whether this will alter the US engagement in the 
Persian Gulf in the longer term depends in the first 
place on how the central framework of American for-
eign and security policy develops. If isolationist ten-
dencies in Washington are boosted by budget crisis 
and domestic conflicts, the shale revolution could be 
used as a justification for stepping back from inter-
national obligations (regardless of any real need to do 
so). But currently there is no sign of that. 
In the medium and long term it is more likely that 
the shale revolution will strengthen tendencies that 
have arisen independently of developments in the 
energy markets. The United States is increasingly 
directing its security interventions towards helping 
regional partners to expand their own capabilities. 
60  Dunn and McClelland, “Shale Gas and the Revival of 
American Power: Debunking Decline?” (see note 55), 1412, 
1418, 1421. 
61  U.S. Department of State, “Joint Press Statement EU–U.S. 
Energy Council”, 2 April 2014. 
62  For example: David Goldwyn, “Making an Energy Boom 
Work for the U.S.”, New York Times, 12 November 2012; Inter-
view with an expert at the Center for a New American Securi-
ty (CNAS) in Washington, D.C., March 2014. 
63  The term “economic statecraft” designates the deliberate 
use of economic resources and instruments (such as sanc-
tions) for foreign policy purposes. 
But in the case of the Gulf region there are also very 
tight bounds to this approach, as long as the GCC 
states fail to work more closely together on shared 
defence priorities, uniform standards and interopera-
bility.64 
 
 
64  For example Awad Mustafa, “GCC Still Struggling to De-
velop Integrated Air Defense”, defensenews.com, 1 May 2014, 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140501/DEFREG04/305
010020/GCC-Still-Struggling-Develop-Integrated-Air-Defense 
(accessed 4 August 2014). 
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The analysis of developments in the energy markets 
presented above has shown that the Gulf producers 
remain the backbone of the global oil supply. At the 
same time, growing production of tight oil (as well as 
other “new oil” like oil shale and gas condensates) has 
kept the oil price stable despite rising demand and 
disruptions in the Middle East and North Africa. This 
comparably stable and long-lasting high-price phase 
serves the interests of oil producers worldwide. More-
over, the discovery of new unconventional reserves 
means that “peak oil” and warnings about the re-
source running out no longer dominate the debate. 
This reduces the audience for those pushing for alter-
natives to oil. 
But the great uncertainty in the markets also af-
fects the Arab Gulf states. As long as demand in Asia 
remains strong, disruptions in Libya and Syria reduce 
supply and Iraq’s difficulties developing its oil indus-
try persist, the rents of the Gulf states are likely to 
remain stable at a high level. These revenues are 
dependent above all on supply and demand, and on 
price trends in the oil and gas markets. Qatar also 
remains in a comfortable position in the global LNG 
market, having concluded long-term contracts for size-
able deliveries to Asia and possessing the necessary 
export infrastructure. 
One trend that is initially independent of the shale 
revolution but a great deal more dangerous for the 
Gulf states is their own surging demand for energy 
and electricity. This demand boom is domestically 
explosive because it places the rent economies under 
pressure on the spending side. It can also lead to a 
reduction in oil and gas exports from the region. That 
in turn would have far-reaching consequences for the 
world economy. This problem threatens to create new 
conflicts in the region. It is clear that the socio-eco-
nomic development model of the Gulf states cannot 
survive unless they succeed in satisfying domestic 
demand for affordable energy as well as upholding 
exports. Thus the shale revolution does have an indi-
rect influence on the handling of this local energy 
crisis. 
The Position of the Gulf States in the 
International Energy Markets 
The Gulf producers remain of immense strategic im-
portance for the global energy supply because they 
control almost one third of the world’s oil reserves. 
Furthermore, several crucial trade routes pass through 
the Middle East. The foremost of these is the Strait of 
Hormuz, through which 20 percent of all internation-
ally traded oil passes, as well as 20 percent of traded 
LNG. This makes the Strait the most important choke 
point of the global energy supply.65 Securing this 
trade route is of particular strategic importance for 
Asia, because 85 percent of the oil shipped through 
Hormuz is destined for the Asian markets (principally 
Japan, India, South Korea and China).66 
However, Saudi Arabia also has the option of using 
its East-West Pipeline to transport crude to the Red 
Sea port of Yanbu for export. This route, which has a 
capacity of 4.8 million barrels/day and considerably 
shortens the distance to the Suez Canal, is especially 
relevant for European purchasers.67 The UAE has a 
pipeline to the emirate of Fujairah on the Gulf of 
Oman, which also offers an alternative to the Strait 
of Hormuz route. 
But regardless of the shale revolution, any major 
loss of supplies from the Gulf would be impossible to 
substitute, because almost one quarter of the world’s 
oil production originates there. Asia is the main desti-
nation for Gulf exports.68 
In 2012, 97 percent of oil exports from UAE went to 
Asia.69 Saudi Arabia exported 15 percent of its oil to 
Europe and another 15 percent to United States, but 
54 percent to Asia.70 It is also strategically relevant 
that the Gulf region produces its oil from enormous 
65  EIA, “World Oil Transit Choke Points”, http://www.eia.gov/ 
countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3 (accessed 
20 June 2014). 
66  Ibid. 
67  EIA, “Saudi Arabia”, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab. 
cfm?fips=SA (accessed 20 June 2014). 
68  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (see note 4), 6, 8, 18. 
69  EIA, “United Arab Emirates”, http://www.eia.gov/countries/ 
cab.cfm?fips=TC (accessed 7 April 2014). 
70  EIA, “Saudi Arabia” (see note 67). 
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The Gulf States and the Changing International Energy Markets 
Figure 5 
Regional distribution of GCC exports of  
crude oil and petroleum product (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (see Fig. 2, p. 8). 
old fields that have the world’s lowest costs (estimated 
to be $3 to $5 per barrel),71 and no less that Saudi Ara-
bia, Kuwait and the UAE possess the largest spare pro-
duction capacity (estimated at 3.1 million barrels/day).72 
Asia also represents the Gulf’s main market for 
natural gas. Qatar is the world’s second largest gas 
exporter (after Russia) and the biggest LNG exporter, 
where it accounts for more than one third of world 
trade.73 In 2012, 63 percent of Qatari LNG exports 
went to Asia.74 As the Gulf’s biggest gas producer, 
Qatar accounts for 4.7 percent of global production.75 
With 25.1 trillion cubic metres, it also possesses the 
world’s third-largest conventional gas reserves after 
Russia and Iran.76 
71  Bassam Fattouh and Laura El-Katiri, Energy and Arab Eco-
nomic Development, Arab Human Development Report, Research 
Paper Series (United Nations Development Programme, Re-
gional Bureau for Arab States, 2012), 9. 
72  Estimates of spare production capacity in the Gulf vary 
widely. The EIA says 2 million barrels/day, the IEA 3.1 million; 
Energy Comment, Global Energy Briefing 6, no. 100 (June and 
July 2014), 7. The IMF puts the figure as high as 4.5 million 
barrels/day; International Monetary Fund (IMF), Annual Meet-
ing of Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors: Economic 
Prospects and Policy Challenges for the GCC Countries (Riyadh, Sau-
di Arabia, 5 October 2013), 7. 
73  Ibid., 29. 
74  EIA, “Qatar”, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm? 
fips=QA (accessed 14 April 2014). 
75  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (see note 4), 22. 
76  Ibid., 20. 
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Regional distribution of  
GCC gas exports (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (see Fig. 2, p. 8). 
The Gulf States and the Changing Inter-
national Energy Markets 
The further one looks into the future, the harder it 
becomes to assess how the shale revolution might 
affect the Gulf states. As well as international price 
developments, a number of factors come into play: 
a possible expansion of oil and gas exports (including 
LNG), a possible increase in (un)conventional oil and 
gas production, and demand trends in different re-
gions and sectors. 
Gas Markets. It would be obvious to conclude that 
Qatar was the big loser of the shale revolution, be-
cause it loses at least the major North American 
market in the longer term. But that would be short-
sighted. Qatar has 90 percent of its short- and medi-
um-term exports (until 2020) secured via sales and 
purchase agreements.77 Even after 2020, the IEA ex-
pects Qatar to remain the most important exporter 
of LNG. It currently possesses 150 billion cubic metres 
of annual LNG export capacity, with another 16 billion 
cubic metres in planning. Qatar enjoys a favourable 
starting position because it has established itself as a 
flexible supplier not only in the long-term trade but 
also mid- to short-term redirecting its market flows. 
It exports to all the regional gas markets. Qatar also 
enjoys a special position thanks to its low production 
costs, its ability to increase its LNG exports within the 
77  EIA, “Qatar” (see note 74). 
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The Economic Impact of the Shale Revolution on the Gulf States 
Map 4 
Gas and oil in the Middle East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
 
capacities of existing liquefactions trains and its own 
large shipping fleet. 
The Asia-Pacific market is the most lucrative desti-
nation for LNG exports. In the medium term Qatar 
must secure its market share there, especially given 
that a series of existing long-term contracts expire af-
ter 2020.78 Numerous LNG export terminals are under 
construction across the world and scheduled to come 
on stream before 2020. They will together provide an 
annual capacity of 150 billion cubic metres (expecta-
tion as of mid-2014),79 with 70 percent located in 
78  Hakim Darbouche, “The Pricing of Internationally Traded 
Gas in MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa”, in The Pricing of Inter-
nationally Traded Gas, ed. Jonathan P. Stern (Oxford: Oxford In-
stitute for Energy Studies [OIES], 2012), 224–45 (237); Andy 
Flower, “LNG in Qatar”, in Natural Gas Markets in the Middle East 
and North Africa, ed. Bassam Fattouh and Jonathan P. Stern 
(Oxford: OIES, 2011), 343–85. 
79  However the viability of many of these projects is ques-
tionable, so delays are likely and some may remain unreali-
Asia.80 So competition in the Asia-Pacific region will 
increase significantly, and is likely to put the high 
price of LNG under pressure.81 The Qataris gain room 
for manoeuvre from the fact that they produce natu-
ral gas under very favourable conditions, and make 
large profits for the state budget not only with gas 
but also on a similar scale with the sale of crude and 
liquids (LNG and condensates). Qatar is also market 
leader in gas-to-liquids technology for converting dry 
gas into diesel, naphtha, etc.82 It is increasingly in-
vesting in other sectors of the LNG business too, and 
might end up earning revenue from US exports of LNG 
as co-owner of terminals in the United States. 
 
sed. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (see note 6), 128. 
80  IEA, Medium-Term Gas Market Report 2014, (see note 30), 130. 
81  Also because the first generation of Qatari LNG contracts, 
which are tied to the Japanese Crude Cocktail, will expire in 
2021 and 2024. 
82  EIA, “Qatar” (see note 74). 
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Figure 7 
GCC share of natural gas imports  
by region (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (see Fig. 2, p. 8). 
These developments are creating conflict within the 
Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). Other tradi-
tional exporters like Russia, Algeria and above all Iran 
(with which Qatar shares the North/South Pars Gas 
Field) insist on oil indexing in long-term contracts, to 
keep gas prices high. But Qatar has already demon-
strated great flexibility in pricing mechanisms for its 
LNG exports to the United States and North-West Eu-
rope, which are tied to Henry Hub or European hubs.83 
In this way Qatar secures its market share at a mo-
ment in time when all gas exporters face competition 
in their traditional markets. 
Oil Markets. The Gulf countries have planned their 
state budgets for an international oil price between 
$55 and $95 per barrel (fiscal break-even price).84 Price 
movements are the decisive determinant here. With 
respect to future developments in the oil markets, it 
is conspicuous how relaxed the Arab OPEC states are 
about the risk of oversupply, even if they do not com- 
83  Contracts with the United Kingdom are tied to the Nation-
al Balancing Point (NBP), those with Belgium to Zeebrügge. 
For detail see Darbouche, “The Pricing of Internationally 
Traded Gas” (see note 78), 237; Flower, “LNG in Qatar” (see 
note 78). 
84  The fiscal break-even price is the threshold above which 
rentier states can fund their budgets. The cited fiscal break-
even prices were named by experts in the region for the re-
spective current budgets. Qatar’s break-even price is said to 
have been corrected this year from $54 to $65 per barrel. The 
figures vary depending on the source. See also “The Oil Price 
Balancing Act in the Middle East”, Middle East Economic Digest, 
9 May 2013, http://www.meed.com/sectors/oil-and-gas/the-oil-
price-balancing-act-in-the-middle-east/3177424.article (ac-
cessed 15 April 2014). 
Figure 8 
GCC share of crude oil and petroleum product 
imports by region (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD (see Fig. 2, p. 8). 
pletely ignore it.85 OPEC’s World Oil Outlook 2013 dis-
misses the danger as temporary, on the grounds that 
the unconventional oil boom will flatten off again be-
fore 2020, and will not expand beyond North America 
anyway.86 Events in Libya, Syria and Iraq appear to 
confirm that assessment. The current destabilisation 
of Iraq by the terrorist group ISIS could further darken 
the country’s oil exporting prospects. Altogether, it is 
increasingly obvious that oil production in the Middle 
East is plagued by uncertainties, with an ever more 
volatile supply situation. With the IEA forecasting that 
additional production in Iraq will cover no less than 
45 percent of expected growth in demand, there will 
be far-reaching consequences in the oil markets if this 
fails to materialise.87 
Geopolitics aside, the situation within the indus-
try also gives grounds for relative calm. Significantly, 
American producers and the Gulf states share an 
interest in a stable and relatively high oil price. In the 
United States the most important geological forma-
tions have high break-even prices of $78 to $96.88 Even 
85  “The Unconventional Oil Age: Shale Is Going Global: 
Its Arrival Will Shape the Supply Picture for Years to Come”, 
Petroleum Economist, February 2014, 36f. 
86  Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), World Oil Outlook 2013 (Vienna, 2013). However IEA 
and OPEC diverge significantly on this point. The IEA sees 
the peak not reached until the mid-2020s, and its forecasts 
see production curves flattening off later than OPEC’s. IEA, 
World Energy Outlook 2013 (see note 6), 481. 
87  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2012, (Paris: IEA/OECD, 2012), 26. 
88  Figures for the Permian Basin, Eagle Ford Shale and 
Bakken Shale formations, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
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if these figures are only approximations, they illus-
trate well the interaction between supply and demand 
in the search for equilibrium: the higher the price the 
more unconventional oil (tight oil, oil shale, oil sands, 
Arctic oil, deep-sea oil, etc.) can be produced.89 The ad-
vantage of tight oil is that it is produced in compara-
tively small projects with short investment cycles. This 
allows the corresponding producers to function as a 
type of swing supplier in the North American market, 
able to respond after a certain time-lag to price rises. 
At the same time, in the medium to long term these 
producers will be the first to be forced out of the mar-
ket. 
Overall the analysis shows that production trends 
in Iraq and Iran have an incomparably greater influ-
ence than the shale revolution. If the nuclear dispute 
is resolved and Western capital and modern technolo-
gy return, Iran might be able to gradually expand its 
exports. That would undermine the quota discipline 
of the oil-exporting countries. Iraq, on the other hand, 
is not bound by quotas. Its production leapt by more 
than 11 percent between 2011 and 2012, before growth 
flattened in 2013 at 0.8 percent.90 But if the political 
situation in those countries improved after all (at least 
in the longer run), and especially if sanctions on Iran 
were also lifted, the Gulf states would indeed see a risk 
of oversupply in the oil markets. It can be assumed 
that unconventional production in North America 
will in fact continue to increase until after 2020. This 
would create great challenges above all for Saudi Ara-
bia, which would have to cut back its own production 
in order to stabilise prices. As a swing supplier it could 
find itself in the position of having to deal with a drop 
in production of almost one million barrels/day.91 Not 
until 2030 would Saudi Arabia return anywhere close 
to its 2012 production figures,92 and that would mean 
even more of its (expensive) capacity lying idle.93 A sit-
2013-10-24/oil-s-5-trillion-permian-boom-threatened-by-70-crude. 
html (accessed 5 April 2014). 
89  The effects on the global markets are indirect, via reduced 
US demand. According to an IEA forecast North America will 
move from being a net importer of oil (5.1 million barrels/day 
in 2012) to a net exporter (1.7 million barrels/day in 2035). 
90  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy (see note 4), 8. 
91  Since the fall of the Shah in 1979, Saudi Arabia has ful-
filled this swing supply function in tacit agreement with the 
United States. 
92  IEA, World Energy Outlook 2013 (see note 6), 484. 
93  In the medium term it is expected that the spare produc-
tion capacity could increase temporarily from 4.5 million bar-
rels to 7 million; IMF, Annual Meeting of Ministers of Finance and 
Central Bank Governors (see note 72), 7. 
uation of significant overproduction could also erode 
the OPEC discipline and encourage certain members 
to exceed their production quotas and/or to lower 
price in order to defend their own market shares and 
crowd out producers. The price slump of October 2014 
may hint at such strategies as Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait do not seem to be willing to curb production for 
the sake of the oil price level. They might also aim to 
pressure other OPEC producers to reduce their respec-
tive quotas and to share the burden. Saudi Arabia can 
sustain a period of lower oil prices as it has no fiscal 
deficit and special state funds. Beyond the geopolitical 
risks, awareness is also growing that the legal and eco-
nomic frameworks fail to offer adequate incentives to 
attract the foreign investment and technology needed 
to overhaul and gradually replace the old supergiant 
oilfields.94 Here again, the impact of the shale revolu-
tion is felt. In view of the broader geological availabil-
ity of oil and gas, hydrocarbon-rich countries must in-
creasingly compete with one another for investments 
by the companies that possess patents on important 
technologies (techniques for dealing with high sul-
phur content, drilling technologies, liquefaction tech-
nology, etc.). 
Despite the shale revolution, the energy markets re-
main subject to the “swine cycle”.95 Rapidly rising de-
mand in combination with a shrinking supply could 
quickly produce very high oil prices. If the demand 
trend remains unbroken, the Middle East will have to 
expand production from 20 million to 22 million bar-
rels/day by 2035.96 However, global oil consumption 
is increasingly concentrated in two sectors: transport 
and petrochemicals. Natural gas could be used in-
creasingly in both, especially in the United States. Such 
fuel switch effects are hard to foresee, and therefore 
amplify uncertainty and discourage investment. 
94  IEA, Mid-Term Oil Market Report 2014, 12, 14f, 18f. 
95  The energy sector is susceptible to this mechanism. When 
prices rise, investment increases, capacity expands and pro-
duction rises. But long lead times mean there is a delay be-
fore the increased supply reaches the market. In order to sell 
the oil the price now has to fall, in turn causing production 
and investment to be scaled back. The central cause of this 
typical supply pattern is the relatively unresponsive, unelas-
tic demand for energy, which prevents the price mechanism 
from functioning properly. Investment decisions are also 
complicated by opacity of commodity markets and some-
times contradictory signals from politics. 
96  BP, Energy Outlook 2035: Fact Sheet Middle East (2014), http:// 
www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/Energy-
Outlook/Regional_insights_Middle_East_2035.pdf (accessed 
1 September 2014). 
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Socio-economic Developments in the Gulf 
Table 
Importance of oil and gas for GDP,  
exports and state budgets in the Gulf states (2013) 
 Oil and gas sector  
as proportion of  
GDP (%)a 
Oil and gas exports 
as proportion of  
total exports (%)b 
Proportion of state  
revenues from oil and  
gas sector (%)a 
Bahrain 21 39.8 83 
Qatar 40.7 91.8 > 75 
Kuwait n.s. 90.7 94 
Oman 11.6 76.4 n.s. 
Saudi Arabia c. 35 85.0 c. 90 
UAE n.s. 58.2 n.s. 
Source: (a) Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Reports, http://www.eiu.com; (b) UNCTAD (see Fig. 2, p. 8). 
 
Major shifts are already becoming felt in the refin-
ing sector too, with indications of a global capacity 
surplus. Refineries compete for cheap high-grade crude 
and for markets for their products. Competition for 
markets in Europe and Asia is becoming tougher, 
where the Gulf states have to hold their own against 
the United States and Russia. This development is es-
pecially important for Europe. The competitiveness 
of European refineries is declining, and in future the 
continent will have to import more of its oil products. 
That has implications for security of supply, because 
the more oil products Europe has to source directly 
from the Gulf or Asia, the greater its dependency on 
the Gulf region and the trade routes there. 
Another development is also noteworthy: The in-
creasing Asian orientation of Arab Gulf states is re-
flected in joint ventures along the entire value chain. 
Where Western, South Korean and Japanese corpora-
tions were traditionally active in the Gulf region, it is 
now increasingly (state-owned) Chinese, Indian and 
Taiwanese entities that are investing there. And state-
owned operators from the Gulf states, in turn, are ex-
panding their distribution and refining activities in 
the major Asian markets. Europe will in future be de-
pendent on these conglomerates, while the Western 
oil giants lose market share along the whole value 
chain. United States, too, must wonder whether the 
growing business relationships between the Gulf 
states and Asian corporations will weaken US influ-
ence on Gulf energy policy.97 
97  At least in the case of Qatar, there are grounds to believe 
that the United States played a role in initiating and develop-
ing the country’s export strategy. 
Socio-economic Developments in the Gulf 
In view of the upheavals in the Arab world, any last-
ing fall in the oil price and/or loss of market share (as 
might be associated with the boom in unconventional 
oil and gas) would represent a threaten to the Gulf 
regimes, which rely on oil and gas revenues to fund 
their domestic and foreign policies. 
In the GCC states as a whole, the oil and gas sector 
supplies 44.2 percent of GDP and 80.7 percent of the 
state budgets.98 In order to run balanced budgets the 
individual countries need an oil price between $55 
and $95 per barrel.99 The oil price thus remains the 
determining variable. Even Qatar, which is seen above 
all as a gas exporter, earns at least as much and some-
times more from sales of crude oil,100 which is ne-
glected in most analyses. 
Although Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar main-
tain considerable state reserves, they also face rising 
costs to fund increasingly proactive foreign policies 
98  Averages for 2010: Fattouh and El-Katiri, Energy and Arab 
Economic Development (see note 71), 13. 
99  Figures for fiscal break-even prices differ even within in-
dividual sources. For Saudi Arabia they vary between $67 
and $86, for Qatar between $46 and $66, for the UAE between 
$67.5 and $87. “The Oil Price Balancing Act in the Middle 
East” (see note 84); “Drop in Crude Price Could Divide Opec”, 
Middle East Economic Digest, 11 July 2013, http://www.meed. 
com/sectors/oil-and-gas/drop-in-crude-price-could-divide-opec/ 
3183186.article (accessed 15 April 2014). 
100  In 2012 sales of natural gas and condensates and of crude 
oil and oil products each contributed 46 percent of Qatar’s 
export revenues. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), UNCTADStat http://unctadstat.unctad. 
org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ 
ChosenLang=en (accessed 16 April 2014). 
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and generous subsidies to placate their populations. In 
their own right, energy subsidies make up a relevant 
share of GDP in all the Gulf states, ranging from more 
than 3 percent in Qatar up to 10 percent in Saudi Ara-
bia.101 The fiscal break-even price continues to rise. It 
is already foreseeable that this trend will be untenable 
in the longer term. 
Collapsing prices and/or volatility could have nega-
tive short- and medium-term ramifications, because 
GDP growth in the Gulf states tracks the oil price. This 
increases macro-economic uncertainty and shortens 
planning horizons. In theory a plentiful global hydro-
carbon base and fuel switching in the transport sector 
could place the producers’ scarcity rents under pres-
sure in the long term. Then rents would become con-
tingent on relatively low production costs and geo-
graphical proximity to markets. That in turn would 
place considerable pressure on state budgets. 
The budgets of the Gulf states are further burdened 
by the generous subsidies that underpin their low 
energy prices. They also rely on affordable energy for 
their economic diversification strategies, which aim to 
extend value chains and keep them in the region. As 
well as developing petrochemicals and energy-inten-
sive industries like aluminium smelting and cement, 
the Gulf states are also encouraging airlines and logis-
tics. However, the smaller emirates in particular end 
up competing with one another in the same sectors. 
A massive conversion is underway in the US petro-
chemicals industry, which is increasingly using eth-
ane (a main component of natural gas) as its feedstock 
in place of crude-based naphtha. To that extent the 
United States will continue to profit from relatively 
cheap energy and from proximity to raw materials 
and markets. But the repercussions of this develop-
ment will primarily affect the competitiveness of Euro-
pean businesses, and less the Gulf states whose gas 
prices remain far below the American level (between 
one tenth and nearly half). Thus Gulf industrial com-
petitiveness still benefits from considerable price ad-
vantages. A second reason why US developments do 
not for the moment threaten the Gulf states is that 
their main market for petrochemical products re-
mains East Asia. But now China is also opening up its 
unconventional gas reserves, and Asia is sourcing 
more gas condensates from the United States. If these 
developments lead to a restructuring and a further 
101  IEA, Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidy Rates as a Proportion of 
the Full Cost of Supply (Paris: OECD and IEA, 2011), http://www. 
iea.org/subsidy/index.html (accessed 7 April 2014). 
expansion of the Asian petrochemical industry,102 the 
Gulf states will lose important market shares in those 
products. 
Growing Domestic Demand, Home-grown 
Crises and Political Quandaries 
Low prices in the Gulf states lead to high energy con-
sumption, which is increasing faster than GDP. De-
mand for energy is rising at between 7 and 11 percent 
annually, more than doubling within the space of a 
decade.103 Unless they succeed in rapidly increasing 
their production of oil and especially gas, and/or in 
substantially improving their energy efficiency, the 
outcome could be an increasingly dwindling supply 
of oil available for export. 
What we see here are the indirect effects of the 
shale revolution. At a juncture where expanding in-
vestment would be required, export revenues have 
become less sure and acquisition of foreign partners 
and technologies more difficult. Given that the cross-
subsidisation of cheap domestic prices by high-volume 
exports cannot continue unabated, energy policy in 
the Gulf is at a turning-point. The extent to which the 
GCC countries are willing to invest in expanding pro-
duction in the face of the uncertainty on the interna-
tional markets remains to be seen. It is questionable 
whether they possess the capacity to implement ener-
gy reforms. Thus the high energy intensity of their 
economies becomes a pressing problem. 
This is particularly apparent in the case of Saudi 
Arabia,104 whose rapidly growing population has 
reached almost 30 million. With fuel, electricity and 
water all heavily subsidised there is no incentive to 
use energy more efficiently. The transport sector ac-
counts for 40 percent of Saudi oil consumption,105 
while more than 50 percent of electricity generation 
in the Gulf states uses oil.106 Saudi Arabia’s electricity 
demand is growing at 7 to 8 percent annually, which 
102  For detail see Fattouh, The US Shale Revolution (see note 38). 
103  Rabia Ferroukhi, Haris Doukas, Stella Androulaki, Ema-
nuela Menichetti, Andrea Masini and Arslan Khalid, EU-GCC 
Renewable Energy Policy Cooperation: Exploring Opportunities, 
GRC Gulf Papers (December 2013), http://eu-gcc.kcorp.net/  
common/publicationfile/49.pdf (accessed 23 April 2014). 
104  For detail see Said Nachet, “Saudi Arabia’s Energy Chal-
lenges”, Saudi Economic Journal (January 2014). 
105  Ibid., 2f. 
106  Bassam Fattouh and Richard Mallinson, Refining Dynamics 
in the GCC and Implications for Trade Flows, Oxford Energy Com-
ment (Oxford: OIES, December 2013), 7. 
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Gas Crisis amidst Rich Reserves 
means doubling every ten years.107 The Kingdom al-
ready consumes almost one third of its own oil pro-
duction (about 3 out of 10 million barrels/day) and its 
entire gas production. Some observers warn that un-
less the rapid growth in domestic consumption is 
curbed, Saudi Arabia will become an oil importer by 
2030. 
The increasing energy demand in Saudi Arabia is 
intensifying the water-energy-food-nexus: Up to 84 
percent of water consumption is taken by agriculture, 
but a growing population and rising prosperity are 
additional drivers. With Saudi Arabia increasingly re-
sorting to desalination, the subsidies on fuel, electrici-
ty and water create a vicious circle. The Kingdom’s 
development path is wasteful of water and energy and 
unsustainable in terms of security of supply.108 In the 
medium term the country’s stability is endangered; in 
the short term electricity blackouts and water short-
ages risk popular dissatisfaction. Growing internal 
energy demand is one of the central factors mediating 
the consequences of the shale revolution for the Gulf 
region: domestic demand and the boom in unconven-
tional energy potentially reduce Saudi oil revenues 
while at the same time the uncertain international 
market environment deters (foreign) investment. Con-
sequently, the fact that no profit can be made from 
domestic sales of oil, gas and electricity plays a much 
greater role than it used to. Subsidies remain a large 
and potentially increasingly burden on the state bud-
get, while export profits threaten to fall. 
The problem here and in other Gulf states is a 
home-grown consequence of political decisions. These 
countries are rich in sunshine and wind and could 
easily put more energy into renewables, not only as 
a component of industrial and technology policy but 
also as a pillar of the energy system in its own right. 
The Gulf states already have renewable energy pro-
grammes addressing some of their future energy 
needs,109 but are simultaneously developing nuclear 
107  More conservative estimates put the increase at 5 to 6 
percent. Kevin Baxter, “Riyadh Races to Raise Gas Produc-
tion”, Middle East Economic Digest, 22 January 2013, http://www. 
meed.com/sectors/oil-and-gas/gas/riyadh-races-to-raise-gas-pro 
duction/3163374.article (accessed 17 February 2014). 
108  Ibid. 
109  By 2022 Qatar hopes to generate 2 percent of its electrici-
ty from renewables. That would represent 640 MW. Despite 
an ambitious renewable energy plan (SIDEBAR) that proposes 
54 GW by 2032, Saudi Arabia had only installed 7 MW solar 
power by 2014. By 2022 7 to 11 percent of the Saudi electrici-
ty supply (24 GW) should be from renewables. Dubai hopes to 
generate 5 percent of its electricity using solar by 2030, Abu 
power. In UAE a nuclear plant with four 1.4 GW blocks 
is scheduled to come on stream in 2020. Saudi Arabia 
could follow in the same footsteps.110 In fact, improv-
ing energy efficiency would be the key to necessary 
change in the Gulf. But that is blocked by the high 
level of energy subsidies. Fundamentally, although 
the Gulf states have recognised the problem, they lack 
the political and bureaucratic capacities to reform the 
energy system and its pricing mechanisms. Ultimately 
this touches on the foundations of power and rent 
extraction of the Gulf. At the same time, their cooper-
ation in the electricity sector remains limited and 
difficult, despite a regional electricity grid being in-
augurated in 2009. 
Gas Crisis amidst Rich Reserves 
To date gas has been the Gulf states’ strategy of choice 
for satisfying domestic demand, perpetuating fossil 
production and utilisation paths. However, all apart 
from Qatar are facing a “gas crisis”. While the IEA re-
ports production in the Gulf rising at about 2.4 per-
cent annually, demand is increasing much faster at 
5.6 percent.111 
Overall, there is insufficient local gas available for 
electricity generation and a lack of transport infra-
structure. Gas production faces a series of difficulties. 
Firstly, too much gas is flared off at wellheads or lost 
to consumption through being pressed back into oil 
fields to maintain production flow. Secondly, produc-
tion of associated gas (extracted together with oil) de-
pends on OPEC quotas. In order to circumvent these, 
Saudi Arabia intends to open up new non-associated 
gas fields. But their development is technically com-
Dhabi 7 percent by 2020. Installed capacity of renewables in 
the UAE is reported to be 155.5 MW (as of 2013). Directorate 
of Energy and Climate Change, IRENA and REN21, Renewables 
Status Report MENA 2013 (Paris, May 2013); Ferroukhi et al., 
EU-GCC Renewable Energy Policy Cooperation (see note 103); King 
Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (K. A. CARE), 
Proposed Procurement Process for the Renewable Energy Program 
(n. p., 2013); Economist Intelligence Unit, Industry Report:  
Energy – Saudi Arabia (London, August 2013). 
110  Peter Shaw-Smith, “Riyadh Aims for Nuclear Plant for 
2020”, Financial Times, 29 September 2011; Matthew Martin 
and Verity Ratcliffe, “Nuclear Aspirations Deflate”, Middle East 
Economic Digest, 20 July 2012, 20f. 
111  Justin Dargin, The Shale Gas Revolution: The Implications for 
MENA and the UAE (October 2013), 21, 
http://www.justindargin.com/uploads/5/1/5/3/5153441/shale_ 
gas_and_mena.pdf (accessed 7 April 2014). 
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plex, because they either contain “sour” gas (high in 
sulphur and toxic gases) or are shale gas or tight gas 
deposits. Production costs are also comparatively high. 
Since the 1980s natural gas has been crucial for 
Saudi Arabian industry.112 But given that recent efforts 
to expand gas production have not been a success 
story, future difficulties must be expected. The Saudi 
gas initiative was launched in 1998, partly in response 
to falling oil prices in the aftermath of the Asian fi-
nancial crisis,113 but abandoned five years later be-
cause Saudi and foreign business interests were too 
far apart. The Saudis wanted cheap gas for their diver-
sification strategy, but the rates of return demanded 
by Western firms were too high. The latter also hoped 
to gain access to oil production, whereas Saudi Arabia 
wanted to open up only non-associated production 
and the state-owned Saudi Aramco sought to preserve 
its upstream monopoly. Circumstances have not im-
proved since then, with estimated production costs for 
new projects between $3.5 and $6 per MBtu (similar to 
the United States).114 So major investment is required. 
At the same time the domestic gas price is about $0.75 
per MBtu, and difficult to raise at present. Saudi Aram-
co consequently announced at the end of August 2014 
that it intended to invest more than $40 billion annu-
ally over the coming decade in order to maintain oil 
production at 12 million barrels/day and more than 
double gas production.115 
112  That is when the Master Gas System, a network of gas 
gathering, pipeline and processing facilities, came on stream. 
113  For detail see Guido Steinberg, “Saudi-Arabien: Öl für 
Sicherheit”, in Petrostaaten: Außenpolitik im Zeichen von Öl, ed. 
Enno Harks and Friedemann Müller (Baden-Baden, 2007),  
54–76 (60). 
114  Saudi Aramco and Shell are negotiating about develop-
ing the promising Kidan Field even before 2020, but there 
has been little progress to date. The Kidan Field in the Rub 
al Khali Desert in the south of the country is expensive, with 
development costs of about $6 per MBtu. Saudi Arabia also 
intends to produce non-associated sour gas from offshore 
fields (Karan Field, Arabiyah and Hasbah). Bassam Fattouh, 
“The Saudi Gas Sector and Its Role in Industrialization: De-
velopments, Challenges and Options”, in Natural Gas Markets 
in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Fattouh and Stern (see 
note 83), 196–234 (220f.). Further invitations to tender were 
prepared in autumn 2013, including for the South Ghawar 
Field in the Eastern Province (the Ghawar Field being the 
world’s biggest oilfield) and for fields on the Iraqi and Jorda-
nian borders in the north. “Aramco Renews Focus on Shale 
Gas”, Middle East Economic Digest, 4 December 2013, 4, 7. 
115  “Saudi Aramco CEO: Oil Industry ‘Needs Timely Invest-
ments’”, Arab News, 26 August 2014, http://www.arabnews. 
com/economy/news/620836 (accessed 1 September 2014). 
The “gas crisis” also has regional dimension. Gas-
rich Qatar would actually be geographically well-posi-
tioned to supply gas to other Gulf states. Since 2007 it 
has been supplying 56 million cubic metres per day 
to Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Oman via the Dolphin Pipe-
line.116 But the pipeline’s capacity is not fully exploit-
ed. The buyers would like to import more but Qatar 
earns much more in the Pacific market.117 Saudi objec-
tions prevent the Dolphin Pipeline from being extend-
ed to Bahrain and Kuwait. 
These developments affect the web of relations be-
tween the Gulf states, potentially in far-reaching re-
spects. Abu Dhabi recently began developing uncon-
ventional gas reserves in its western territories and is 
building an LNG import terminal and regasification 
facilities. In spring 2014 Oman agreed a pipeline con-
struction project with Iran that – if realised – would 
enable it to export Iranian LNG to India and other 
Asian countries and dash UAE’s dreams of becoming 
the regional gas hub. Oman is geographically better 
placed, and by avoiding the choke point of Hormuz 
the new pipeline would offer Iran strategic advan-
tages. Gas importers like Kuwait and UAE, which are 
looking for or already using alternatives in Russia, 
Iran and North America, could also profit from less 
strained gas markets. On the other hand, rising re-
gional gas demand amidst a changing international 
energy landscape could spark conflicts over borders. 
Iran shares with its Arab neighbours at least fifteen 
gas and oil fields in areas where the border is contest-
ed, including Qatar’s important North Field, which 
stretches over into the Iranian South Pars Field. If 
Qatar lifts its North Field production moratorium in 
2015, far-reaching conflict with Iran could ensue. 
 
116  Amy Myers Jaffe, Jareer Elass and Keily Miller, The Gulf 
Cooperation Council Natural Gas Conundrum: Geopolitics Drive Short-
ages amid Plenty (25 October 2013), 9, http://bakerinstitute.org/ 
news/the-gulf-cooperation-council-natural-gas-conundrum-
geopolitics-drive-shortages-amid-plenty/ (accessed 7 April 
2014). 
117  The price negotiations are difficult because the UAE and 
Oman wish to pay no more than $1.30 per MBtu with price 
rises under 2 percent. In summer 2010 short-term interrupti-
ble contracts were arranged at prices of $5 per MBtu. Ibid., 15. 
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The Economic Elites and the Shale Revolution 
Political Consequences for Gulf States 
 
In the coming years the policies of the Gulf states 
will be shaped by domestic economic problems and 
changes in energy markets. Saudi Arabia, UAE and 
Qatar fill leading roles in the region and have for 
some years been pursuing increasingly active foreign 
policies. Given steadily rising the costs of those inter-
ventions and of the generous subsidies required to 
placate their own populations, any longer-term fall in 
international oil and gas prices would be difficult to 
compensate financially and could negatively affect 
their stability. While stability is not currently acutely 
endangered, they are heavily dependent on strong 
revenues to fund state benefits for their citizens. 
Surprisingly, though, the shale revolution does not 
feature highly in domestic policy debate in the Gulf 
states. It could, however, further deepen their leaders’ 
worries (observed since 2011, above all in the oil states 
Saudi Arabia and UAE, less so in Qatar) that the United 
States could withdraw from Middle East and abandon 
the region to its enemies, above all Iran. Already today 
that perception leads Saudi Arabia to pursue an in-
creasingly autonomous and sometimes aggressive re-
gional policy. Growing awareness of the economic con-
sequences of the shale revolution could amplify fears 
about a US withdrawal and tendencies to adopt an of-
fensive stance in the region. 
The Economic Elites and the Shale Revolution 
The Gulf states are and remain so central to the global 
energy markets that their governments feel little anxi-
ety over the repercussions of the US shale revolution 
on their energy sectors and economies. Public debate 
in the region did not even touch on the issue until 
2013, and it is conspicuous that perceptions of the 
shale revolution remains reduced to economic and 
energy policy aspects, the discussion consequently 
dominated by economists. The geopolitical aspects are 
barely mentioned in the Gulf states. 
At least outwardly, the powerful Saudi oil bureau-
cracy remains unimpressed by the shale boom, which 
it regards as natural consequence of high prices en-
abling development of unconventional reserves. Saudi 
Oil Minister Ali Al-Naimi has spoken in that vein, while 
Aramco CEO Khalid Al-Falih even welcomed addition-
al “new oil” as a price-dampening element. With the 
Saudi oil bureaucracy assuming that today’s global oil 
demand of about 90 million barrels/day will increase 
to about 110 million barrels/day by 2030, growing US 
production – which Aramco does not expect to exceed 
6 to 7 million barrels/day – would in fact be crucial for 
securing the global energy supply.118 One advisor to 
the Saudi oil ministry even argued at the 2013 Mana-
ma Dialogue that the shale boom was a “bubble” set to 
burst.119 The influence of the Saudi oil bureaucracy is 
probably responsible for OPEC taking a very similar 
stance. Its World Oil Outlook forecasts the boom in un-
conventional oil flattening off very quickly, before 
2020, and remaining restricted to North America.120 
Critical voices in Saudi Arabia have a hard time 
gaining a public hearing, with energy and economic 
questions no exception. The only successful example 
to date was Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal Al Saud’s May 
2013 open letter to the oil minister, which he pub-
lished on Twitter. Prince Al-Waleed criticised the 
state’s dependency on oil revenues and demanded a 
rapid diversification of the Saudi economy which, he 
said, had been left vulnerable by competition from 
American shale oil. The letter was notable because 
Prince Al-Waleed is one of the world’s richest business-
men and a grandson of the founder of the Saudi state, 
Ibn Saud. But he remains excluded from the inner cir-
cle of power in Saudi Arabia because his father be-
longed to the opposition “free princes” movement in 
the early 1960s. In recent years both have repeatedly 
demanded deep reforms, but to little avail. 
118  Ed Crooks, “Saudi Arabia Welcomes US Shale Oil Boom”, 
Financial Times, 14 May 2013. 
119  Discussion with Mohammed Al Sabban at the IISS Ma-
nama Dialogue on 8 December 2013. He also pointed to the 
problem of high domestic consumption in Saudi Arabia and 
the other Gulf states, which he said needed to be limited. 
120  The IEA forecasts diverge considerably from this esti-
mate, see note 86. 
SWP Berlin 
The US Shale Revolution and the Arab Gulf States 
November 2014 
 
 
 
27 
 
Political Consequences for Gulf States 
Risks to Internal Security 
Against the backdrop of the “Arab spring”, the shale 
revolution has the potential to negatively impact the 
stability of the Gulf states. But apart from Bahrain, 
where suppression of the spring 2011 protests led to 
ongoing unrest, there are only sporadic and rather 
isolated indications of any real danger to the regional 
rulers. 
One such sign is the great nervousness with which 
the Gulf regimes responded to the political upheavals. 
This applies above all to Saudi Arabia, where in spring 
2011 King Abdullah announced direct and indirect 
transfers to the population amounting to about $130 
billion. This move is one important reason why the 
Saudi fiscal break-even price has rising so strongly 
over the past three years. Spending also increased in 
all the other Gulf states as they expanded their securi-
ty forces by several tens of thousands and stepped up 
their presence in potentially restive regions. Saudi 
Arabia applied this above all to the Eastern Province, 
where Shiites represent up to 15 percent of the popu-
lation (between two and three million people) and are 
massively discriminated against by the government. 
The Shiite-populated areas saw repeated demonstra-
tions, which continued after 2011. Riyadh is particu-
larly sensitive about the Shiites of the Eastern Prov-
ince (and Bahrain) whom it regards as a potential 
Iranian fifth column. The Saudis accuse Tehran of 
inciting Shiite minorities in order to destabilise the 
Gulf states. Since 2011, incidents in the Eastern Prov-
ince have become a regular occurrence, with many 
Shiite youths becoming radicalised after losing faith 
in the possibility of achieving equality by peaceful 
means. The “Shiite problem” acquires a particular 
strategic edge through the geography, where the oil 
industry and all the biggest oilfields are also located 
in the Saudi Eastern Province.121 
Fear of its own Shiite population was also behind 
the Saudi invasion of Bahrain. In March 2011 Saudi 
Arabia, with UAE, Kuwait and Qatar in tow, inter-
vened to prop up the Bahraini regime after Shiite 
protests threatened to spiral out of control. Like in 
the Saudi Eastern Province, the conflict in Bahrain 
continues to fester. Since 2011 there have been almost 
nightly clashes between demonstrators and security 
forces in the Shiite villages surrounding Manama. 
121  Guido Steinberg, Anführer der Gegenrevolution: Saudi-Arabien 
und der arabische Frühling, SWP-Studie 8/2014 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2014), 10ff. 
Many young protestors have been killed, very occa-
sionally police. Activists increasingly use Molotov 
cocktails and in there have been a number of un-
claimed attacks using small improvised explosive 
devices.122 Violence could explode at any moment 
in Bahrain. If it did, there would be enormous reper-
cussions for security in eastern Saudi Arabia. 
A second sign of the nervousness of the Gulf rulers 
is attempts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to suppress 
the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. 
Their rejection of the Brotherhood is rooted above all 
in their perception that it promulgates a rival – more 
modern, republican and frequently also revolutionary 
– interpretation of political Islam. After the victory of 
the al-Nahda Party in the November 2011 elections in 
Tunisia it was clear that the Brotherhood and ideolog-
ically related groups would play an important role in 
the Arab transformation states. They feared that this 
new threat from Egypt could be as dangerous to them 
as President Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, who prop-
agated pan-Arab nationalism, socialism and the top-
pling of the regional monarchies. The “Arab cold war” 
he provoked, conducted above all in Yemen, caused 
great trouble for the Saudi regime.123 
In the early 1990s Islamists influenced by the Mus-
lim Brotherhood dominated a strong opposition move-
ment in Saudi Arabia. So when the transnational Mus-
lim Brotherhood took power in a country as impor-
tant as Egypt, with the accession of President Morsi in 
2012, the Saudi ruling family saw this as a danger to 
the internal stability of their own kingdom. 
The measures taken by the Gulf states against the 
Muslim Brotherhood cumulated in July 2013 with Sau-
di Arabia, UAE and Kuwait supporting the Egyptian 
military coup against Morsi.124 At the same time they 
tightened internal repression, which is directed in 
Saudi Arabia partly, but in UAE primarily against the 
122  Inga Rogg, “Eskalation in Bahrain: Polizist durch Spreng-
satz getötet”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 October 2012. 
123  Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and 
His Rivals 1958–1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 3rd edi-
tion 1971), passim. 
124  It can be assumed that the governments of Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE were informed in advance of the coup plans and 
may even have argued for the coup. Hardly a week after the 
Muslim Brotherhood was overthrown, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Kuwait announced that they would support Egypt over 
the subsequent months with budget assistance, central bank 
deposits and oil products totalling $12 billion. Michael Peel, 
Camilla Hall and Heba Saleh, “Saudi Arabia and UAE Prop 
Up Egypt Regime with Offer of $8bn in Aid”, Financial Times, 
10 July 2013. 
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Muslim Brotherhood. This was surprising given that 
the emirates branch of the organisation, al-Islah, was 
regarded as rather weak. In March 2014 both coun-
tries, ignoring evidence to the contrary, declared the 
Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation. 
Foreign Policy Consequences 
Changes in the energy markets have knock-on effects 
on the international constellation in the Persian Gulf 
and thus on the foreign policy options of the Gulf 
states. Shifts in US interests and policies – real or per-
ceived as such by actors in the Gulf – come into play 
here, as do patterns of cooperation and conflict be-
tween the Gulf states. 
The Arab Gulf states are all strongly dependent on 
the United States, without which they would be in-
capable of defending themselves against their power-
ful neighbours Iraq and Iran. The United States has 
provided a de facto security guarantee to Saudi Arabia 
since 1945, originally regarding the USSR as the prin-
cipal threat. Since the 1970s the US guarantee has 
become one of the central pillars of Gulf security. In 
the course of three major wars (1980–1988, 1990/91, 
2003), Washington’s alliance with the Arab Gulf states 
and hostility to Iraq and Iran has drawn it ever deeper 
into the region’s conflicts. 
However, the perceptions of Riyadh and Washing-
ton have grown apart since the 1990s. Since 2002/2003 
the differences of opinion have focussed on Iraq and 
Iran, with Riyadh vehemently opposing the 2003 Iraq 
War on account of Saddam Hussein’s value as a coun-
terweight to Iran. Ever since then the Saudis have held 
persistent doubts as to Washington’s regional political 
judgement, a concern further nourished by US policy 
towards Iran. Most of the Saudi ruling family regards 
the Iranian nuclear programme as a purely military 
endeavour directed primarily against Iran’s Persian 
Gulf neighbours. What unsettles Riyadh is less the 
idea of Iran one day actually using nuclear weapons, 
but that Tehran could exploit a nuclear umbrella to 
support militant groups in neighbouring countries 
and thus destabilise the Gulf region with impunity. 
King Abdullah is indeed reported to have insisted that 
the United States attack Iran and “cut off the head of 
the snake”.125 
125  Reportedly said during a meeting of leading Saudi princ-
es with US General David Petraeus, commander of the multi-
national forces in Iraq, and the US ambassador in Baghdad, 
But since 2013 at the latest it has become apparent 
that Riyadh’s worries extend far beyond the Iranian 
nuclear programme, to encompass more generally 
Tehran’s striving for hegemony in the Gulf region and 
the Middle East. For that reason Saudi Arabia would 
not in fact welcome any US-Iranian agreement on the 
nuclear programme, because of the danger of Wash-
ington permitting Iran to establish regional domi-
nance in return for nuclear concessions. Correspond-
ingly, Riyadh’s official response to the interim agree-
ment between Tehran and the E3+3 in November 
2013 was very reserved. Internally, the Kingdom even 
threatened to turn its back on the United States, while 
the official government press railed against the deal.126 
American reactions to the “Arab spring” have fur-
ther worsened relations between Washington and 
Riyadh. From the Saudi perspective the overthrow of 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 
was a turning point. The ruling family was shocked 
when the Obama Administration showed not the 
slightest intention of standing by its long and loyal 
ally. The logical conclusion for Riyadh was to become 
more proactive itself in supporting its friends. Saudi 
Arabia thus increasingly became the protector of the 
region’s monarchies and, as already mentioned, con-
tributed actively to the restoration of military rule in 
Egypt in 2013. 
Another turning point was the chemical attack by 
the Syrian army in the eastern suburbs of Damascus 
on 21 August 2013, in which about 1,400 civilians 
died. The Saudi were irate when Obama changed his 
mind after initially announcing a military strike 
against Assad, concluding that Syria and Iran would 
now cease to take American threats seriously. Riyadh’s 
immediate response was to step up aid to selected 
rebel groups in Syria from September 2013.127 The 
Ryan Crocker. During the discussion the Saudi ambassador 
to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, “recalled the King’s fre-
quent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end 
to its nuclear weapons program”. Cable from US Embassy in 
Riyadh, “Saudi King Abdullah and Senior Princes on Saudi 
Policy toward Iraq”, 20 April 2008, http://www.wikileaks.org/ 
plusd/cables/08RIYADH649_a.html (accessed 6 September 
2013). Yousef al-Otaiba, UAE ambassador to Washington, 
made similar statements. 
126  Damien McElroy, “Iran Nuclear Deal Changes Middle 
East Alliances as Saudi Arabia Rebels against US”, Telegraph, 
25 November 2013. 
127  It is reported that Saudi Interior Minister Prince Prince 
Mohammad bin Naif intervened at the beginning of 2014 to 
moderate his country’s Syria policy. The motive may have 
been worries, especially in the interior ministry, that Saudi 
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extent to which the Saudi government intends to con-
tinue this policy was not yet apparent of mid-2014. 
The implications of the shale revolution for the for-
eign policy alignments of the Gulf states, not least 
Saudi Arabia, can only be understood against the back-
drop of these irritations with the United States. While 
Washington downplays the consequences of the frack-
ing boom for US policy towards the region, percep-
tions within the Gulf states are quite different. Alt-
hough the shale revolution does not yet play any ma-
jor role in their domestic debates, it does threaten to 
deepen alienation from the United States. Since the 
mid-2000s, growing mistrust of Washington has led 
Riyadh to pursue an increasingly active regional poli-
cy, working to counteract real or imagined Iranian 
encroachments in the Levant and in Yemen. The Gulf 
media were soon talking of an “aggressive” or “offen-
sive policy” (siyasa hujumiya). The shale revolution 
and associated fears of a US withdrawal could further 
strengthen these trends. 
Saudi Arabia’s “offensive policy” also has conse-
quences for relations among the Gulf states. Since the 
1990s the smaller countries – UAE, Kuwait and Qatar – 
have in general orientated even more closely on the 
United States than on Saudi Arabia, expecting bilat-
eral ties to the superpower to offer more effective pro-
tection against Iraq and Iran. But Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar came closer together after 2010, following a 
period of tense rivalry between 1996 and 2008. Grow-
ing fear of Iran probably played an important role. The 
easing of relations was still noticeable in the early 
months of the “Arab spring” when fears that the move-
ment was spiralling out of control ensured that all the 
Gulf states took a cautious stance on Syria and initial-
ly avoided taking sides. 
Later the smaller Gulf states went different ways. 
UAE supported Riyadh in Bahrain, Egypt and Syria and 
repressed the Muslim Brotherhood even more aggres-
sively than the Saudis. Again, one motive was fear of 
Iran and dissatisfaction with Washington, although 
less unequivocally in the case of UAE because of differ-
ences between individual emirates. Because of its eco-
nomic ties with Tehran, Dubai is regarded as more 
Iran-friendly than Abu Dhabi, but has seen its influ-
ence decline since the global financial and economic 
crisis of 2008/2009. Now all important political deci-
sions are taken in Abu Dhabi. 
jihadists fighting in Syria could later return to the Kingdom. 
At the end of January 2014 Saudi Arabia made it a crime to 
participate in armed struggle abroad. 
Qatar, on the other hand, attempted a dual strate-
gy. While continuing to seek good relations with 
Riyadh, participating with a symbolic contingent in 
the intervention in Bahrain and coordinating with its 
larger neighbour over Arab League affairs, Doha also 
made it clear that it would continue to conduct its 
own independent foreign policy of supporting the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This created conflict with UAE 
in particular, where Abu Dhabi and Dubai massively 
repressed the Brotherhood. The dispute escalated dur-
ing the months following the July 2013 coup in Egypt, 
when Riyadh ratcheted up pressure on Doha to re-
nounce support for the Muslim Brotherhood. When 
Doha refused, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain recalled 
their ambassadors at the beginning of March 2014. 
Political relations between Qatar and its Gulf neigh-
bours had reached a historic nadir. 
Although the shale revolution has to date had no 
direct impact on this relationship, the “gas crisis” and 
Qatari gas certainly do play an important role. Rela-
tions between the UAE and Qatar are also burdened by 
Doha’s refusal to supply more gas at the conditions 
demanded by Abu Dhabi. The Dolphin Pipeline from 
Qatar to UAE and on to Oman is operating far below 
capacity. The fraught relationship between Saudi Ara-
bia and Qatar has also prevented any expansion of 
the regional gas network towards Kuwait. So political 
problems between the Gulf states stand in the way of 
the most obvious answer to gas shortages, namely 
supply from friend and ally Qatar. This raises the ques-
tion of what purpose a regional organisation like the 
Gulf Cooperation Council actually fulfils, if its mem-
bers cannot even supply one another with urgently 
needed resources. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The shale revolution has contributed to maintaining 
equilibrium of supply and demand in the global oil 
markets. In the international gas markets it causes 
LNG flows to be diverted to Asia and Europe. The 
United States (more precisely North America) is on 
the road to self-sufficiency in energy and the Gulf 
region will in future concentrate even more strongly 
on the Asian growth markets. For Europe that means 
meeting its own growing demand largely from the 
energy-rich regions of Africa, Russia and the Caspian 
that are geographical close and possess existing infra-
structure. 
The Middle East will remain important for Germa-
ny and Europe as the backbone of the global oil mar-
kets and determinant of price trends. Two trends are 
central. Firstly, geopolitics will remain an important 
factor in the Gulf region, despite or precisely because 
of the shale revolution, engendering considerable 
uncertainty. Secondly Europe must prepare itself to 
share the burden of securing its energy supplies, in-
cluding those from the Middle East, with the United 
States. There is, however, a range of different cost/ 
benefit calculations within the European Union. 
While several southern member-states are strongly 
dependent on imports from the Gulf, many others do 
not presently import strategically significant propor-
tions of their oil and gas supplies from there. But if 
refinery closures in Europe shift trade flows to such 
an extent that more oil products have to be imported 
from the Gulf region or from the large refinery com-
plexes in Asia, direct dependency on the Gulf would 
increase for the European Union as a whole. Protect-
ing maritime trade routes will therefore remain a 
priority for global security and international energy 
cooperation. 
Only in the long term and in interaction with po-
litical factors do developments in the oil and gas mar-
kets have the potential to undermine the stability of 
the regimes in the Arab Gulf states. Tight oil and shale 
gas play a rather subordinate role here; the decisive 
factors are demand for oil in Asia and quota redistri-
bution within OPEC, should Iraq and Iran crowd into 
the markets. 
In the short and medium term the Gulf states will 
have to ensure their own energy supplies while still 
making oil available for export. They find themselves 
confronted with this challenge at a difficult time, with 
shrinking global market shares and downward price 
pressure. The current socio-economic model cannot 
simply be extrapolated into the future. The Gulf states 
are aware that they must overcome their dependency 
on oil and gas if they are to ensure their long-term sta-
bility. To this end they are all pursuing more or less 
serious diversification policies that also seek to create 
jobs for their own citizens. But it is precisely these 
diversification efforts that could be endangered by 
the shale revolution, if fracking ends up being export-
ed to Asia or the Asian petrochemicals sector were to 
switch to condensate feedstock (for example from the 
United States). 
The changes in the energy markets also create for-
eign policy and security challenges for the Gulf states. 
Although there is as yet little evidence of the United 
States pulling back from the Gulf on account of its 
domestic shale revolution, the characteristics of US 
engagement must be expected to change in the longer 
term. Firstly, economic (energy-sector) measures such 
as energy-based sanctions against Iran could grow in 
importance relative to military instruments. Washing-
ton will also increasingly press its Gulf partners to 
expand their own capacities to share the security bur-
den. Largely independently of the debate within the 
United States, developments in energy policy could 
strengthen the doubts that already exist in the Gulf 
states about Washington’s reliability as a guarantor 
of security. 
Secondly, the shift in energy demand towards the 
Asia/Pacific markets creates a conflict potential in the 
Sino-American relationship, all the more so if China 
were to seek to back up its economic interests in the 
Persian Gulf with security engagement. This scenario 
meets with utter rejection in Washington. Precisely 
for that reason the United States will look above all to 
traditional partners such as Germany and other EU 
member states for security burden-sharing. This devel-
opment has not yet been adequately reflected in Ger-
many and the European Union. 
In view of the economic, domestic and foreign poli-
cy challenges facing the Gulf states, the following 
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policy recommendations can be made for Germany 
and Europe: 
Germany has no influence on the internal politics 
of the Gulf states, but it does enjoy good commercial 
relations. If the German government wishes to play a 
role in the Gulf it should give these relations a politi-
cal dimension. This includes pointing out that the 
Gulf states can only preserve their stability if they per-
mit greater participation and expand participation 
and rule of law. In all cases this means abandoning 
exclusion and working instead towards inclusion of 
political opponents. In Saudi Arabia this relates in the 
first place to equality for religious minorities, in the 
UAE renouncing the massive repression against the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
Germany’s influence on energy markets is limited. 
The geopolitical imponderables in the Gulf and the 
associated supply risks give the German government 
good reason to further reduce import dependency and 
to push on with reconfiguring the German energy 
system for greater sustainability. Because oil is primar-
ily consumed in transport and mobility, the German 
Energiewende (energy transition) should concentrate 
more strongly on that sector, especially as new trends 
increasingly force Germany and Europe to import 
more petroleum products rather than crude oil. This 
can affect both prices and security of supply, as state-
owned Chinese and Indian corporations cooperate 
with state-owned corporations in the Gulf states and 
increasingly dominate trade, processing and market-
ing. 
The situation with natural gas is different. Qatari 
LNG is strategically important for European import-
ers, also because it is a significant diversification fac-
tor. The European Union must send clear signals to 
Doha if it hopes to import more Qatari gas. 
Furthermore, Germany’s energy cooperation with 
selected Gulf states could be placed on a broader foot-
ing; for example in the scope of an energy partnership 
to create a political framework for closer cooperation 
in (new) gas and oil production, in the feedstock in-
dustry, and also in renewables and energy efficiency. 
The uppermost goals must be to strengthen existing 
international governance forums and to advance 
multilateral cooperation in questions of producer/ 
consumer dialogue, transparency and technological 
cooperation. The international dialogue should be 
intensified, and the major Asian consumers included. 
In terms of foreign and security policy, Germany 
should work within NATO and the European Union 
towards closer cooperation with the United States and 
the Gulf states in the field of maritime security. A 
starting point is offered by the EU Maritime Security 
Strategy adopted in June 2014 by the Council of the 
European Union, which recognises the great impor-
tance of maritime security for energy supplies and 
identifies protection of international shipping as a 
core interest of the European Union. The document 
proposes mobilising all the Union’s civilian and mili-
tary instruments to that end, including the Common 
Security and Defence Policy. However implementation 
now needs to be in the focus with the action plan de-
fining concrete measures and timetables due at the 
end of 2014. It is also problematic that although the 
European Union defines itself explicitly as a global 
security actor, the Maritime Security Strategy remains 
focussed on the European neighbourhood. It refers to 
the North Sea, the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Mediter-
ranean and the Arctic – but makes no explicit mention 
of the Persian Gulf. 
Opportunities for the European Union and its 
member-states to assume a more prominent role in 
the Persian Gulf exist especially in developing naval 
and coastguard capacities in the Arab states. At least 
in the longer term it would also be conceivable for 
the European Union and the GCC to hold joint exer-
cises and for Europe to support the creation of mine-
sweeping capacities. 
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 Abbreviations 
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations 
BCF Billion cubic feet 
BIS Bureau of Industry and Security (United States) 
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy 
E3+3 France, United Kingdom and Germany plus United 
States, Russia and China (Iran nuclear talks) 
EIA Energy Information Administration 
EPCA Energy Policy and Conservation Act (United States) 
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (United 
States) 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GECF Gas Exporting Countries Forum 
GTL Gas to liquids 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IEF International Energy Forum 
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency 
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
MBtu Million British thermal units 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NAVCENT United States Naval Forces Central Command 
NBP National Balancing Point 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OIES Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
OPEC Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
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